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TESHUVA: A LOOK AT REPENTANCE,
FORGIVENESS AND ATONEMENT IN
JEWISH LAW AND PHILOSOPHY AND
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
Samuel J.Levine*

INTRODUCTION

In his contribution to a recent UCLA Law Review symposium,'
Professor Stephen Garvey introduces and develops the possibility
of viewing "punishment as atonement."' 2 Garvey describes an
"ideal community" in which punishment serves as "a form of secular penance aimed at the expiation of the wrongdoer's guilt and his
reconciliation with the victim and the community."'3 Recognizing
that the concept of atonement "sounds religious," Garvey insists
and sets out to demonstrate that "atonement makes perfectly good
sense independent of religion. '" 4 Nevertheless, Garvey acknowledges that "religion is one place where you'll find atonement's
roots" and identifies St. Anselm's eleventh century work as an
early example of a theological discussion of atonement.5 In further
discussions of "theological atonement," Garvey cites not only
* Law Clerk to the Honorable David N. Edelstein, United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York; former Assistant Legal Writing Professor &
Lecturer in Jewish Law, St. John's University School of Law; LL.M. 1996, Columbia
University; Ordination 1996, Yeshiva University; J.D. 1994, Fordham University; B.A.
1990, Yeshiva University.
Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Hebrew were made by the author. As a
result, the Fordham Urban Law Journaltakes no responsibility for the author's interpretation of Hebrew materials and the propositions those works support.
This Essay was submitted in connection with the Symposium, The Role of Forgiveness in the Law, held at Fordham University School of Law on January 28, 2000. 1
thank the editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for their interest in the subject
of the Essay and Fraida Liba and Yehudah Tzvi for their encouragement.
1. See Symposium, The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1719 (1999).
2. See Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801
(1999).
3. See id. at 1802. A similar approach has been proposed by a federal judge who
"hypothesize[s] that in certain cases it would be beneficial to society if... we were to
permit certain of them who are sincerely sorry to repent, atone for their crimes, and
to seek, with the potential for earning, an official forgiveness - a 'fresh start."' Richard Lowell Nygaard, On the Role of Forgiveness in Criminal Sentencing, 27 SETON
HALL L. REV. 980, 983 (1997).
4. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1803.
5. Id. at 1802-03 (citing ST. ANSELM, CUR DEUS HOMO, in SAINT ANSELM: BA-

SIC WRITINGS 171 (S.N. Deane trans., 2d ed. 1962)).
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Christian sources but also, briefly, Jewish sources, which he traces
to the biblical book of Leviticus.6
Garvey posits that his analysis of theological atonement "shed[s]
some light on the problem of punishment in our secular world." 7
According to Garvey, parallel to theological accounts of atonement, which "depend critically on treating God as the object of the
sinner's identification," a secular account of atonement "take[s] the
object of identification not to be God, but one's community and its
members."'8 Thus, having largely dispensed with the need to distinguish, for analytical purposes, between theological and secular approaches, Garvey relies on sources based in various forms of moral
philosophy to develop an extensive description of the "process of
atonement. "9
The aim of this Essay is to carry forward Professor Garvey's project through a more detailed exploration of the concept of
teshuva1° in Jewish law and philosophy. The principle of teshuva is
6. See id. at 1807-08 (citing Leviticus 16:1-34).
7. Id. at 1810.

8. Id.
9. See id. at 1813-29.
10. Though often translated as "repentance,"
SOLOVErrCHIK ON REPENTANCE

see, e.g.,

PINCHAS

H. PELI,

(1984) (translating the Hebrew title "Al Ha-

teshuva"), the Hebrew term "teshuva" is a derivation of the Hebrew root for returning, highlighting the purpose and dynamics of teshuva. Teshuva affords humans a
process through which they are able to renounce and repair the improper actions that
have led them astray, returning to God and to their own true selves by following the
path that God has set down. Cf. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1816 (writing that an apology "distances and disassociates the true self from the guilt-tainted self"); MAIMONIDES, MISHNE TORAH [CODE OF LAW], Laws of Teshuva 2:4 (documenting the practice
of changing one's name after undergoing the process of teshuva, to demonstrate that
"I am someone else, not the person who committed the wrongful act").
Indeed, a number of foundational biblical verses describing the imperative for
atonement speak of "returning" to God. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 4:30, 30:2, 30:10; Hosea 14:2. This verse from Hosea, which begins with the Hebrew word "shuva," or
"return," opens a section from the writings of the Hebrew prophets that is read publicly on the Sabbath during the period of teshuva, observed between the holidays of
Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur. This Sabbath is commonly known, alternately, as
either the Sabbath of "shuva" or the Sabbath of "teshuva." That these terms are used
interchangeably to label this Sabbath further demonstrates that these words not only
share a common root, but, in the context of atonement, also connote a very similar
concept.
As Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik explained, although a human cannot actually harm
God, the commission of a wrongdoing creates a distance between a person and God.
See PELI, supra, at 85 (citing MAIMONIDES, supra, Laws of Teshuva 7:7 (quoting Isaiah
59:2)). Maimonides movingly describes the transformative power of teshuva, through
which the person who "yesterday was distant from God... today clings to God." See
MAIMONIDES, supra, Laws of Teshuva 7:7. It is through teshuva, then, that the individual can both "return" to God and "return" to the self who does not carry the
burden of sin.
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fundamental to Jewish law and philosophy.'1 Jewish law views it as
apparent that human beings are, by their very nature, fallible and
incapable of avoiding all sin, 12 and thus through the possibility indeed the obligation 13 - of teshuva, God provides humans a
means of achieving atonement for wrongdoings. 4
The complete process of teshuva thus involves not only repentance and remorse,
but a more complete achievement of forgiveness and atonement. For the purposes of
this comparative study, the more limited concept of charata - or remorse - is
equated with Garvey's use of the term "repentance," compare MAIMONIDES, supra,
Laws of Teshuva 2:2, with Garvey, supra note 2, at 1814, while teshuva is used to refer
to the broader process of atonement. Cf ADIN STEINSALTZ, TESHUVAH 3 (Michael
Swirsky ed. & trans., 1996).
Broadly defined, teshuva is more than just repentance from sin; it is a spiritual reawakening, a desire to strengthen the connection between oneself and
the Sacred ....
[A]t the root of the notion of teshuva lies the concept of
return (shivah)-return,not only to the past.., but to the Divine source of
all being.
Id. See also Nygaard, supra note 3, at 985 n.17 (stating that "metanoia," though
"[u]sually translated as 'repentance,' ... actually means something richer [,] closer to
'whole change' or 'new state' of mind, indicating a wholly new direction").
The word "teshuva," transliterated from the Hebrew, appears in English works in a
variety of other forms as well, including teshuvah, t'shuvah and t'shuva. In the interest
of consistency, I have altered the spelling in some quotations to conform with a uniform transliteration of "teshuva." In the interest of faithfulness to the original works,
however, I have not altered the spellings of the titles of the works cited.
11. See STEINSALTZ, supra note 10, at 3 ("Teshuva occupies a central place in Judaism . . ."). See also generally 2 ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH
THOUGHT ch. 15 (Abraham Sutton ed., 1992).
12. See 1 Kings 8:46; Ecclesiastes 7:20; Psalms 103:3. For a discussion of moral
vulnerability and susceptibility to temptations of evil in the human condition, see
ABRAHAM R. BESDIN, REFLECTIONS OF THE RAV: LESSONS IN JEWISH THOUGHT 4450 (1979) (adapted from lectures of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik). Cf Garvey supra
note 2, at 1811 (quoting P.S. GREENSPAN, PRACTICAL GUILT: MORAL DILEMMAS,
EMOTIONS, AND SOCIAL NORMS 133 (1995)) (describing a "morality built on a view of
human nature as imperfect but improvable").
13. For discussions of whether teshuva is considered a Biblical commandment and
of its precise mode of performance, see KAPLAN, supra note 11, at 205 n.5; PELI, supra
note 10, at 67-76.
Even if teshuva is not technically counted as one of the 613 commandments enumerated in the Torah, it is clearly an obligation incumbent upon an individual who
sins. See PELI, supra. For a discussion of the concept, identification and derivation of
unenumerated Biblical obligations, see Samuel J. Levine, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and UnenumeratedBiblical Obligations:A Preliminary Study in Comparative Hermeneutics, 15 CONST. COMM. 511 (1998).
14. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 30:2-3; Isaiah 1:18;43:25, 44:22. See also STEINSALTZ,
supra note 10, at 3-4 ("All forms of teshuva, however diverse and complex, have a
common core: the belief that human beings have it in their power to effect inward
change.").
The opportunity for teshuva is often portrayed in Jewish thought as a manifestation
of Divine beneficence that allows those who have violated God's laws to return to the
proper path and atone for wrongdoing. See, e.g., BACHYA IBN PAQUDA, DUTIES OF
THE HEART, Introduction to Section 7; RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, SHA'AREI
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Though the verses in Leviticus cited by Garvey represent an early
depiction of the mechanics and purposes of atonement in Jewish
law, teshuva has occupied a central place in Jewish thought, from
the Bible and the Talmud to the legal and philosophical writings of
medieval and modern scholars.' 5 These sources portray a complex
process consisting of several steps required of the penitent individual, a process strikingly similar to that which Garvey describes.
This Essay looks to further develop some of Garvey's ideas by
closely analyzing teshuva, which stands as an illuminating conceptual analog to Garvey's depiction of secular atonement.' 6
TESHUVA 1:1; RABBENU NIssIM GERONDI (RAN), DERASHOT HARAN 98-99, 107
(Leon A. Feldman ed., 1973); STEINSALTZ, supra, at 4.
According to the Talmudic sages, this possibility of altering reality after the
fact, which is one of the mysteries of all being, was created before the world
itself. Before the laws of nature came into existence ... a principle even
more fundamental and more exalted was proclaimed: that changeteshuva-is possible.
STEINSALTZ, supra, at 4.
15. For discussions in English of the history, sources, development and methodology of the Jewish legal system, see IRVING
RELIGIOUS LAW:

(1993);

A. BREITOWITZ,

BETWEEN CIVIL LAW AND

THE PLIGHT OF THE AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES

307-313

228-39, 281-

399 (Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., 1994); Menachem Elon, The Legal
System of Jewish Law, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 221 (1985); DAVID M. FELDMAN,
BIRTH CONTROL

ABORTION

IN JEWISH

3-18 (1968);

LAW:

MARITAL

RELATIONS,

CONTRACEPTION

AND

AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC

289-304
(1991); Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theory:
PERSPECTIVES IN LAW: FORMALISM AND FLEXIBILITY IN JEWISH CIVIL LAW

Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24

HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 441, 447-77 (1997).

16. A substantial body of literature has developed debating the efficacy of relying
on religious sources to analyze and apply secular concepts in the American legal system. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); KENT GREENAWALT,
PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION
IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997); MICHAEL J.
PERRY, LOVE AND POWER:

THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN

POLITICS (1991); MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY (1988); Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square:Making Democ-

racy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499 (1998); Symposium, Law
and Morality, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1984); Symposium, Religion and the JudicialProcess: Legal, Ethical,and EmpiricalDimensions, 81 MARQ. L.
REV. 177 (1998); Symposium, The Role of Religion in Public Debate in a Liberal Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849 (1993); Ruti Teitel, A Critiqueof Religion as Politics in

the Public Sphere, 78

CORNELL

L.

REV.

747 (1993).

A less extensive but similar debate has focused on the application of Jewish legal
theory to American law. Compare Samuel J. Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish
Law and its Application to the American Legal System, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1037, 103738 n.2 (1998) (citing, as examples of scholarship endorsing such application, David R.
Dow, ConstitutionalMidrash: The Rabbis' Solution to Professor Bickel's Problem, 29
Hous. L. REV. 543, 544 (1992); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale M. Rosenberg, Guilt:
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The process of atonement that Garvey proposes places separate
obligations on the wrongdoer and the victim. The initial burden,
understandably, falls on the wrongdoer, who must engage in "expiation,"'1 7 a moral journey consisting of the four steps of "repentance, apology, reparation and penance."' 8 After the wrongdoer
Henry Friendly Meets the MaHaRal of Prague,90 MICH. L. REV. 604, 614-19 (1991)),
with id. at 1038 n.3 (citing, as examples of scholarship expressing a more cautious
approach, Steven F. Friedell, Book Review: Aaron Kirschenbaum on Equity in Jewish
Law, 1993 BYU L. REV. 909, 919 (1993); Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the
Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Model in ContemporaryAmerican Legal Theory,
106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 893-94 (1993)).
Regardless of the different stances taken in these debates, the application of Jewish
law appears appropriate here, given Garvey's own acknowledgment of religion and
Jewish law as early sources for the concept of atonement, see supra text accompanying
notes 5-6, as well as Garvey's willingness largely to dispense with distinctions between
the secular and the religious in discussing the process of atonement. See supra text
accompanying notes 7-9.
17. See Garvey, supra note 2, at 1813.
18. Id. Before describing the steps that comprise the process of secular atonement, Garvey establishes that, as a prerequisite to undertaking the process, a wrongdoer must first experience "guilt." See id. at 1810. A person who commits a wrong,
according to Garvey, "acquires guilt" or "becomes tainted." Id. Indeed, he writes,
"feeling guilt is the appropriate-the virtuous or morally decent-response to one's
wrongdoing." Id. at 1810-11. It is the sense of "being 'tainted,' or more ominously
'disfigured' or 'polluted,"' id. at 1810, that, ideally, leads to engagement in the path of
atonement as a means of removing the taint. See id. at 1810-13.
For discussions of the importance of feeling guilt or shame in order to facilitate
teshuva, see, e.g., Ezekiel 18:61-63; Ezra 9:6; RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note
14, ch. 1, at 21-22.
It should be noted that one of the caveats inherent to a comparative study of legal
systems composed in different languages involves inevitable ambiguities in syntax.
See supra note 10, discussing the translation of "teshuva." Thus, for example, while
Garvey emphasizes a distinction between "guilt," which he sees as a positive reaction
to wrongdoing, and "shame," which he sees as unproductive and unlikely to result in
atonement, see Garvey, supra, at 1811-13, the Hebrew terms for these concepts carry
no such contrasting connotations. Indeed, one contemporary scholar of Jewish law,
relying on Hebrew primary sources but writing in English, expresses concerns similar
to those of Garvey despite using terminology that would appear to contradict Garvey's assertions. According to Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan, one who repents "should experience deep shame" but "should not sink into depression.., knowing how ready God is
to forgive.. . ." See KAPLAN, supra note 11, ch. 15, at 18-19. Cf. STEINSALTZ, supra
note 10, at 6.
[G]enuine regret for one's misdeeds and recognition of one's failings do not
necessarily lead to the desired outcome ... instead, they can cause a deepening sense of despair and a fatalistic resignation. Rather than promoting positive changes, such despondency, regarded in our tradition as one of the most
serious afflictions of the soul, can cause one to sink even further.
Thus remorse ... must be accompanied by something else: belief in the possibility of change. In this sense, the principle of teshuva - that no matter
what the starting point ... penitence is possible - is itself and important
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has completed this journey, the victim is then obligated to forgive
the wrongdoer, thus completing the process of atonement through
a "reconciliation of the wrongdoer and the wronged."' 19 This Essay
likens Garvey's system of atonement to the process of teshuva,
comparing the obligations placed on both parties and the requisite
methodology for achieving true atonement.

I.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE WRONGDOER

In Jewish thought, the process of teshuva20 is often described
broadly in four stages, similar to Garvey's process. 21 Although the
precise enumeration and identification of these stages varies
among scholars, 22 the general formulation of the process of teshuva
contains essentially the same elements listed by Garvey: 23 remorse,
resolution not to repeat the wrongdoing, confession and changing
one's ways.24 The similarity in the general conceptual frameworks
source of reawakening and hope ....[K]nowing that there is no irredeemable situation [ ] can itself serve as a goad to teshuva.
Id. at 6-7. "[W]e focus on our blemishes and faults, not in order to wallow in guilt, but
to use our flaws for leverage in the effort to progress ....Evil deeds, once recognized,
become a constant goad and encouragement to reform." Id. at 56.
19. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1813.
20. Scholars have emphasized that teshuva is a complex and often difficult process,
akin to a spiritual journey. See PELI, supra note 10, at 89 (comparing process of
teshuva to a journey along the circumference of a circle, in the course of which it may
be difficult to realize that the path ultimately leads to the desired objective); STEINSALTZ, supra note 10, at 7 (comparing one who engages in teshuva to "a person on a
journey who at some point decides to change direction" and stating that "the new
path, like the one abandoned, is long and arduous").
21. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
22. See STEINSALTZ, supra note 10, at 4.
Many books and articles have been written about teshuva, providing detailed
analyses of the various stages of the process form start to finish. Yet, for all
this elaboration, a few fundamental principles underlie all forms and levels
of teshuva .... In fact, two essentials are found in every kind of teshuva: the
renunciation of a regretted past and the adoption of a better path to be followed henceforth.
Id.
23. Scholars also list these elements in various orders, many of which differ somewhat from the order described by Garvey. For the purposes of this comparative
study, Garvey's order has been adopted as a general framework. Indeed, Garvey's
own list is a compilation based on the enumerations of different theorists. Compare
Garvey, supra note 2, at 1804 n.4 (stating that "[a]tonement involves four components
- repentance, apology, reparation, and ...penance (though not all of these are

always required)" (quoting

RICHARD SWINBURNE, RESPONSIBILITY AND ATONEMENT

81 (1989))), with id. (listing "perception of wrongdoing, guilt, and repentance" (quoting JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 272 (1986))).
24. See KAPLAN, supra note 11, at 209; id. at n.37-40. These elements are, indeed,
quite similar to those articulated by Garvey. Thus, attention should be paid to the
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of Garvey's process of secular atonement and the process of
teshuva may allow for meaningful comparisons and contrasts of the
two systems.
A. Repentance
Garvey relies on a definition of "repentance" as
the remorseful acceptance of responsibility for one's wrongful
and harmful actions, the repudiation of the aspects of one's
character that generated the actions, the resolve to do one's best
to extirpate those aspects of one's character, and the resolve to
atone or make amends for the [wrong and] harm that one has
done. 25
Garvey thus sees repentance as a crucial first step in removing the
taint of wrongdoing because it is "active," leading "[t]he repentant
self [to] focus[ ] on the wrongdoing that produced the stain in the
26
first place and on what the self can now do about it."

In Jewish law and philosophy, remorse for a wrong, coupled with
the resolution not to repeat the wrongdoing, is likewise essential to
any possibility of atonement. In particular, as Maimonides writes
in his Code of Law, these elements of repentance are prerequisites
to effective confession. 27 Words of apology that are not accompasimilarity in substance rather than to the slight difference in terminology, as the terms
used for the elements in Jewish thought are translations of the original works. See
discussions supra notes 10, 18.
Because the Bible serves as the fundamental source of Jewish law and philosophy,
many of the medieval scholars who discuss the process of teshuva cite various Biblical
sources for the different stages of teshuva.
For example, verses cited as sources for the step of remorse include Hosea 14:2,
cited in SA'ADIA GAON, EMUNOTH V'DEOTH 5:5; Jeremiah 8:6, cited in RABBENU
YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14, ch. 1, at 10; Jeremiah 31:18, cited in MAIMONIDES,
supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:2; Joel 2:14, cited in BACHYA IBN PAQUDA, supra
note 14, ch. 7, at 4.
Sources cited for the requirement to resolve not to repeat the wrongdoing include

Hosea 14:4, cited in SA'ADIA
GERONDI, supra, ch. 1, at 11,
PAQUDA, supra.

GAON, supra; Isaiah 55:7, cited
MAIMONIDES, supra; Job 34:32,

in RABBENU YONAH
cited in BACHYA IBN

Confession is included as part of the process of teshuva in such Biblical sources as

Hosea 14:3, cited in SA'ADIA GAON, supra; Leviticus 5:5, cited in RABBENU YONAH
GERONDI, supra, ch. 1, at 40; Numbers 5:6-7, cited in MAIMONIDES, supra, 1:1; Proverbs 28:13, cited in BACHYA IBN PAQUDA, supra.
Finally, the need to change one's ways is derived from such sources as Hosea 14:2,

cited in

SA'ADIA GAON,

supra; Isaiah 55:7, cited in

RABBENU YONAH GERONDI,

supra, ch. 1, at 11, MAIMONIDES, supra, 2:2, BACHYA IBN PAQUDA, supra.
25. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1814 (quoting Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance, Punish-

ment, and Mercy, in

REPENTANCE:

A

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

26. Id. at 1815.
27. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:3.

143, 147 (1997)).
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nied by sincere feelings of regret and resolve to change remain
empty, bereft of the crucial element that lends them meaning. 8
Citing a powerful analogy from the Talmud, Maimonides emphasizes the futility of an attempted confession that lacks the proper
intent. 19 The analogy compares such a confession to an immersion
for ritual purity undertaken while the impure individual continues
to grasp onto the very object that rendered the individual ritually
impure. 30 Just as it is impossible for ritual purification to take effect until the individual casts away the impure object, it is inconceivable that the purifying effects of confession will set in before
the improper acts have been cast aside through regret and resolve
for the future. 3 '
In addition to its value as an illustration of some of the underlying principles of teshuva, the analogy to the laws of ritual purity
underlines the legal nature of teshuva in Jewish thought. Indeed,
since the times of Maimonides, scholars of Jewish law have used
Maimonides' Laws of Teshuva, incorporated as a section in his
Code of Law, as a springboard for extensive legal discussions of the
concept of teshuva.32 Among the works of contemporary scholars,
Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik's discourses are perhaps the most notable example of careful and technical legal analysis of teshuva
33
through an exposition on Maimonides' Code of Law.
Rabbi Soloveitchik posits that according to Maimonides, the role
of resolve for the future in the process of teshuva depends on the
specific nature of the individual's teshuva. Rabbi Soloveitchik observes that, in Chapter 1 of Laws of Teshuva, Maimonides lists re28. Cf. Matthew Atkinson, Red Tape: How American Laws EnsnareNative American Lands, Resources, and People, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 381 (1998) ("It's
difficult to take seriously an apology that is not coupled with atonement." (citation
omitted)); Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
1009, 1017 (1999) ("For an apology to comfort the injured party, it must be sincere, or
at least perceived to be sincere .... [W]hen an apology is given too cavalierly, the
listener may question its meaning."); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in
Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1177-78 (1997) ("Like other important rituals, an
apology is worthless unless the required gestures are filled with meaning. Apologies
are speech-acts .... ").
29. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:3 (citing TALMUD

BAVLI,

Ta'anith 16a).
30. See id.
31. Cf. SWINBURNE, supra note 23, at 82, cited in Garvey, supra note 2, at 1814
n.47 ("Repentance also involves a resolve to amend - you cannot repent of a past act

if you intend to do a similar act at the next available opportunity.").
32. See, e.g., PELI, supra note 10.
33. A portion of these discourses have been collected in PELI, supra note 10.
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morse prior to resolution for the future, while in Chapter 2, the
order of these two elements is reversed.34
Asserting that there is no contradiction between the two descriptions, Rabbi Soloveitchik instead suggests that in Chapter 1, Maimonides refers to teshuva that is motivated by emotion, resulting
from the wrongdoer's spontaneous inner feelings of shame, which
instinctively lead to remorse. In such a scenario, he explains, it is
the individual's sense of utter remorse that automatically brings
about the resolve never to commit the same wrongs.3 6 Chapter 2,
according to Rabbi Soloveitchik, describes an individual who has
arrived at teshuva on an intellectual level, who understands the impropriety and negative effects of sinful behavior and therefore resolves not to engage in such behavior in the future.37 In such a
case, the individual does not immediately experience passionate
feelings of remorse; rather, remorse will grow out of the individual's continued determination not to repeat the wrongful actions in
the future.38
Thus, the first step in both Garvey's process of atonement repentance - and in the path of teshuva - remorse and resolution
not to repeat the wrongdoing - incorporate elements of emotional
commitment and future resolve, which must be met before continuing on the road to atonement.
B.

Apology

The next stage Garvey sees in the process of atonement, "confession," serves as "the wrongdoer's public expression of his repentance, whereby he openly acknowledges his wrongdoing and
simultaneously disowns it."39 Alluding again to the theological
roots of the concept of atonement, Garvey refers to an apology as a
"secular ritual of expiation.""n Such expiation is achieved through
34.
35.
36.
37.

See id. at 188 (citing MAIMONnDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 1:1, 2:2).
See id. at 200.
See id. at 200-01.
See id. at 202-03.
38. See id. at 204; cf STEINSALTZ, supra note 10, at 5.
The recognition of the need [for teshuva] comes about in different ways.
Sometimes one is overcome by a sense of sinfulness, of blemish, of defilement, which resulted in a powerful desire for escape and purification. But
the desire [for teshuva] can also take more subtle forms, feelings of imperfection or unrealized potential, which spur a search for something better.
Id.

39. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1815.
40. Id. (quoting NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA
AND RECONCILIATION

at viii (1991)).
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the profound willingness of the self to "accept[] responsibility for
its wrongdoing but at the same time disavow[ ] the wrong.
"41 In
42
it.
"expels"
then
and
guilt
"embraces"
apology
an
short,
Vidui - confession, or apology - likewise serves an indispensable function in the process of teshuva. Through vidui, the individual unequivocally accepts responsibility for wrongdoing, at the
same time displaying an outward expression of remorse and a willingness to make amends for the wrong.4 3 Maimonides delineates
the essential elements of vidui, which include: language demonstrating a clear admission of having committed a wrong against another; precise articulation of the wrong; a statement of strong
44
remorse; and a declaration of a desire not to repeat the wrong.
In his more detailed description of vidui, Maimonides, who is
known for precision and economy of language, 45 repeatedly emphasizes the importance of verbalizing the feelings of remorse and
resolve.46 In addition, Maimonides cites Talmudic sources that
praise an individual who recites an extended form of vidui by ex47
panding on the more basic elements of confession and apology.
Building on Maimonides' discussions, Rabbi Soloveitchik offers
an important psychological insight to explain the power and signifi41. Id. at 1816.
42. Id.
43. Through an analogy to medical ailments, the medieval legal authority Rabbenu Nissim Gerondi (Ran) illustrates the significance of open admission of wrongdoing in the process of teshuva. Ran observes that a doctor cannot heal an individual
suffering from a physical malady unless the patient reveals the illness fully to the
doctor. Similarly, to be healed of the spiritual ailments that accompany wrongful acts,
an individual must acknowledge and identify the wrongdoing, to the self and to God,
so that the process of teshuva can begin. See RAN, supra note 14, at 149-50 (citing
Hosea 7:1). See also RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14, ch. 2, at 8 (employing a similar analogy).
Fundamental sources of Jewish law and philosophy have often used an analogy to
physical health to help illuminate the notion of the spiritual ailments connected to
wrongdoing and, conversely, the healing that accompanies teshuva. See, e.g., BACHYA
IBN PAQUDA, supra note 14, ch. 7, at 1 (citing Jeremiah 31:29); MAIMONIDES, supra
note 10, Laws of De'oth, chs. 2,4; MAIMONIDES, INTRODUCTION TO COMMENTARY ON
THE MISHNA, Introduction to Pirke Avoth; PELI, supra note 10, at 146-50 (citing
Psalms 103:2-4; Isaiah 6:10; 57:19); RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14, ch. 2,
at 3 (citing Isaiah 33:24; Psalms 41:5); id. ch. 4, at 1 (citing Isaiah 6:10; Psalms 41:5);
RAN, supra note 14, at 99-100; id. at 107 (citing Hosea 14:5; Ezekiel 18:27-28; TALMUD
BAVLI, Yoma 86a-86b).
44. See RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14, ch. 1, at 1; see also generally
KAPLAN, supra note 11, ch. 16.
45. See ISADORE TWERSKY, INTRODUCTION TO THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES
(MISHNEH TORAH) 97 (1980).
46. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 1:1, 2:2, 2:9.
47. See id. at 1:1.
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cance of verbal vidui. Rabbi Soloveitchik notes that human nature
sometimes leads a person, consciously or otherwise, to refuse to
accept the reality of certain unfavorable facts. 48 Among the mechanisms a person may employ in the attempt to deny an unfortunate
reality, he observes, is to avoid verbally expressing the unpleasant
truth. 9 Perhaps one of the most difficult truths that a person must
face involves the acknowledgment of having committed a wrongful
act.50 Through the verbal expression of vidui, then, rather than
continuing to evade responsibility by deluding others and possibly
one's self as well, the individual admits to the truth of the wrongdoing, thereby facilitating the process of teshuva.5
48. See PELI, supra note 10, at 93.
49. See id.

50. See

CHAIM SHMtJLEVITZ, SICHOTH MUSSAR

74-76 (1980) (citing numerous

sources in Jewish thought describing the tendency of an individual to justify wrongful
acts and the importance of overcoming such an inclination). Cf. TALMUD BAVLI,
Avoth ch. 5, at 9 (listing qualities that indicate wisdom, including willingness "to admit
error," can be interpreted literally as "to admit truth").
51. See PELI, supra note 10, at 93-96. Cf Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty,

and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58

NOTRE DAME

L.

REV.

445, 480

(1983).
Genuine repentance as well as such states as contrition, remorse, the feeling
of guilt, and the desire for atonement, all require some sense of continuity
with the past and self-identity with an earlier wrongdoer. The essence of
these states is the deliberate taking of responsibility for an earlier doing. To
deny one's identity with the wrongdoer is to evade or deny responsibility for
his crimes, quite another thing form repentance.
Id.; Theresa Klosterman, Note, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth Commission
in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 833, 838-39 (1998)
(stating that, on a societal level, "[d]etermining the truth about human rights violations is crucial" and that "officially sanctioned ... acknowledgment is important because, in many religious and ethical traditions, it is a prerequisite to societal
forgiveness and atonement."); Seymour Moskowitz & Michael J. DeBoer, When Silence Resounds: Clergy and the Requirement to Report Elder Abuse and Neglect, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 67 (1999) ("The 'confession' can be the catalyst for new behavior.
In fact, repentance and accountability for the evil in which the penitent participated
may ameliorate or end past wrongs."); STEINSALTZ, supra note 10, at 5-6.
The great obstacle in the way of teshuva... is self-satisfaction .... This great
stumbling block has been referred to by one sage as "obtuseness of the
heart." Obtuseness of the mind is easily recognized as an impairment of
cognitive functioning; that of the heart is more insidious, a condition of
blocked moral and emotional awareness. Without this prodding awareness,
however slight, without some feeling of inadequacy, no amount of intellectual sagacity can change a person's behavior .... The initial perception and
awakening is, in effect, the first and most inclusive "confession." When a
vague feeling of discomfort turns to clear recognition that something is
wrong, and when that recognition is expressed in words spoken either to
oneself, to God, or to another person, the first step in the process of
[teshuva] has been taken, the part that relates to one's previous life and
character.
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Thus the second stages of both Garvey's process and of teshuva
require a public expression and acceptance of the wrongdoer's responsibility for the bad act, and an overt articulation of regret and
repudiation of the wrong.
C. Reparation and penance
In Garvey's depiction of the process of atonement, it is incumbent upon the wrongdoer, after feeling remorse and, through apol'52
ogy, verbally expressing such feelings, to "make amends.
Garvey suggests that most crimes result in both harm and a moral
wrong; therefore, according to Garvey, the remedy for a wrongdoing consists of two corresponding actions, reparation and penance.5 3 Because reparation, in the form of restitution or
compensation, "makes amends for the harm the wrongdoer does,
but not for the wrong he has done," Garvey explains, in addition to
'54
making reparations, "the wrongdoer must submit to penance.
Thus, Garvey refers to penance as "the final, critical piece of the
expiation half of the atonement process. '55
Id.; Scott E. Sundby, The CapitalJury and Absolution: The Intersectionof Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1584 (1998) (documenting that a capital defendant's "acceptance of responsibility truly does influence
the jury's decision making" and that "a defendant's verbal acknowledgment of his
killing would increase the likelihood of receiving a life sentence").
This explanation of the importance of verbal vidui would further appear to be the
rationale behind the principle, which Maimonides again cites from the Talmud, that a
person should engage in public vidui as an effective step in the process of teshuva.
See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:5.
Criticizing those who view public apologies as merely "shaming penalties," Garvey
cautions us not to "forget that the offender is not only being exposed and shamed,
he's also making an apology. Indeed, as far as atonement goes, treating an apology as
nothing more than a chance to cause shame misses the point." See Garvey, supra note
2, at 1816 (emphasis in original).
For descriptive and normative discussions of the use of apology in the American
law, see, e.g., id.; Cohen, supra note 28; Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.591 (1996); Steven Keeva, Does Law Mean Never
Having to Say You're Sorry?, A.B.A. J., December 1999, at 64; Levi, supra note 28;
Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rossett, The Implicationsof Apology: Law and Culture
in Japan and the United States, 20 L. & Soc'Y REV. 461 (1986).
52. See Garvey, supra note 2, at 1816, 1818. Cf Moskowitz & DeBoer, supra note
51, at 67 (emphasizing that "[t]rue repentance does not deal with feeling, but with
action-changing one's behavior, reversing direction"); Reverend Katherine Hancock
Ragsdale, The Role of Religious Institutions in Responding to the Domestic Violence

Crisis, 58

ALB.

L.

REV.

1149, 1168 (1995).

53. See Garvey, supra note 2, at 1816-27.
54. Id. at 1818.
55. Id. at 1819.
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Garvey defines penance as "a self-imposed punishment, i.e., selfimposed hardship or suffering, which completes the process of expiation and finally rids the wrongdoer of his guilt. '56 Penance
plays a unique role in Garvey's view of atonement, which "insists
that punishment should do more: It should restore the offender to
full standing in the community."57 To explore the potent question
of "[h]ow suffering manage[s] to effect this restoration," Garvey
mandates the need "to shift perspectives. 5'1 Specifically, Garvey's
approach requires us "to look at punishment not from the victim's
perspective, but from the wrongdoer's."59 This simple yet
profound suggestion recognizes that often a wrongdoer "will feel
smaller than before" and "will experience anger and resentment
toward himself." 60 Significantly, Garvey explains, "the wrongdoer
cannot restore his own moral standing unless he submits to
punishment."61
Regarding penance, Rabbi Soloveitchik's discourses on teshuva
again provide a helpful complement to Garvey's thoughts. Like
Garvey, Rabbi Soloveitchik establishes a framework for analyzing
the concept of penance based on the premise that the commission
of a wrong results in two interrelated but distinct consequences.
He explains that, on one level, in relation to the victim, a wrongful
act produces liability on the part of the offender. 62 Similar to Garvey, Rabbi Soloveitchik posits that to counteract this culpability,
the individual must engage in reparation, through the payment of
restitution or compensation.63 Thus, one kind of teshuva effects
kappara,a form of forgiveness or acquittal from wrongdoing. 64 An
individual who undertakes this kind of teshuva both literally and
metaphorically pays a debt owed to another and is thereby released from further liability.65 Indeed, Rabbi Soloveitchik notes an
etymological link that underscores the corresponding conceptual
similarity between reparation and this form of forgiveness: kappara
derives from the same root as kofer, the Hebrew term for payment
of an obligation.66
56. Id.

57. Id. at 1822.
58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Id. at 1823.

61. Id.
62. See PELI, supra note 10, at 49-50.

63.
64.
65.
66.

See
See
See
See

id. at 50-51.
id. at 51.
id.
id.
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Yet, this form of teshuva does not adequately amend for the second result that Rabbi Soloveitchik attributes to the commission of
a wrongful act. Employing an approach that anticipates Garvey's,
and relying on various sources of Jewish thought, 67 Rabbi
Soloveitchik examines the effect of wrongdoing on the individual
who has committed the improper act. Specifically, he acknowledges the spiritual defilement caused by the impurity of sin.68 To
return from such spiritual defilement, Rabbi Soloveitchik explains,
the individual must do more than merely pay the victim any obligation arising out of the wrongdoing. 69 As in Garvey's system, in the
final stages of teshuva, Jewish law demands not only reparation,
but, more importantly, penance, in the form of fundamental
change in the individual's mode of behavior.7 °
To erase fully the taint of the wrongdoing and thus to obtain a
restored place in the community, an individual must engage in
what Rabbi Soloveitchik terms teshuva of tahara (repentance of
purification), a more extensive form of spiritual purification or expiation.7 ' Like penance, teshuva of tahara requires that a person
undertake self-imposed forms of hardship, ones that relate to and
address directly the particular nature of the act committed.72
67. Rabbi Soloveitchik bases his approach on an idea he finds expressed in Biblical sources as well as in both legal and narrative strands of the Talmud, the halacha
and the aggada. See id. at 51-55. For a discussion of halacha and aggada in Jewish
thought, see Samuel J. Levine, Halacha and Aggada: TranslatingRobert Cover's "No-

mos and Narrative," 1998

UTAH

L.

REV.

465.

68. See PELI, supra note 10, at 51. In addition to its powerful philosophical implications, the notion of a change that takes place in the wrongdoer's personality is expressed in a technical legal sense as well. The Talmud documents Jewish law's
acknowledgment of this change in spiritual status through the disqualification as credible witnesses of those individuals who have not reformed from their improper ways.

See id. at 55-56 (citing

TALMUD BAVLI,

Sanhedrin).

69. Cf MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 1:1 (emphasizing that a person who damages another does not achieve atonement merely through the payment
of restitution or compensation).
70. See id. at 2:2 to 2:4.
71. See PELI, supra note 10, at 51-52.
72. For example, the Talmud discusses the acts of penance required of a usurer,
who, as a result of violating the laws of the Torah, has been disqualified as a credible
witness. The Talmud instructs that the usurer must destroy all credit slips and refuse
to lend money on interest under any circumstances, even when it may be legally permissible to do so. See PELI, supra note 10, at 56 (quoting TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin
25b). Thus, teshuva of tahararequires, for the purposes of restoring spiritual purity
and the resulting testimonial credibility, acts that demonstrate a renouncement even
of the conditions that led to the improper past behavior. See id. Cf MAIMONIDES,
supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:4 (describing such practices as "distancing one's self
far from the means of wrongdoing, changing one's name to demonstrate that 'I am
not the same who committed those acts,' changing all of one's ways toward the good
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Through teshuva of tahara, then, an individual truly regains and
returns to the state of undefiled spirituality lost as a consequence
of the wrongdoing.73
HI.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE WRONGED: RECONCILIATION

Once the wrongdoer has successfully completed expiation and
the guilt has thereby been removed, Garvey writes, it is then time
for the victim to complete the process of atonement through forgiveness. 74 According to Garvey, forgiveness "achieves the reconciliation of wrongdoer and wronged. ' 75 Specifically, Garvey
suggests, just as expiation "enables an offender to purge the taint
of guilt," expiation coupled with forgiveness "enables the victim to
76
overcome his resentment.
Discussing the mechanics of forgiveness, Garvey argues that
although
[a] victim may permissibly extend forgiveness to a wrongdoer
who has done nothing but repent ... a victim may also legiti-

mately withhold forgiveness until the wrongdoer has paid his
debt in full, i.e., until the wrongdoer has not only repented but
also apologized, made reparations, and endured his
77 penance.
Indeed, forgiveness may take some time in coming.
Ultimately, however, Garvey considers forgiveness "one of th[e
victim's] responsibilities. '7 8 Indeed, Garvey finds that "[i]t reflects
a moral failure.., for victims to withhold forgiveness unreasonably
and proper path, and exiling one's self"); RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14,
ch. 1, at 35.
73. See PELI, supra note 10, at 55-56. The medieval scholar Rabbenu Yonah Gerondi elaborates on the biblical analogy of cleaning a stained garment to describe different modes and levels of teshuva and their effectiveness in removing the spiritual
taint of wrongful acts. See RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14, ch. 1, at 9
(citing Jeremiah 4:14; Psalms 51:4). Specifically, he points to the difference between a
superficial washing of a garment, which may remove dirt, and a more thorough cleaning, which will restore the garment's original color and brightness. See id. Cf RAN,
supra note 14, at 108 (citing TALMUD BAVLI, Yoma 86b) (describing different types of
teshuva and corresponding levels of expiation); STEINSALTZ, supra note 10, at 53
("Teshuva has two essential phases: a leap of disengagement from the past, and a
lengthier, more arduous process of rectification. The first phase is one of destruction,
the second of reconstruction."). See generally KAPLAN, supra note 11, ch. 17.
74. See Garvey, supra note 2, at 1813.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1828. Cf Nygaard, supra note 3, at 984 ("Forgiveness looks evil in
the eye, condemns it, but still permits one who meets the forgiver's criteria, to start
anew.").
77. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1828 (emphasis in original).
78. Id. at 1827. Cf. Levi, supra note 28, at 1178 (stating that the "effectiveness [of
an apology] in reconciliation depends not only on the speaker but also on the partici-
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from offenders who have done all they can do to expiate their
guilt.""
A similar approach to the dynamics of forgiveness is found in
Jewish thought. Discussing the obligations owed to the victim,
Maimonides explains that teshuva in the form of reparations is not
sufficient, but that the wrongdoer must repeatedly appease the victim and ask for forgiveness. 80 The responsibility on the wrongdoer
is such that, if the victim initially refuses the request, the wrongdoer must continue to make a number of attempts to obtain
forgiveness.81
Nevertheless, once the wrongdoer has repeatedly demonstrated
a sincere hope for reconciliation, parallel to Garvey's approach,
Jewish law places the burden on the victim to grant forgiveness. In
the powerful formulation of Maimonides, if the victim continuously
denies forgiveness, the wrongdoer is released from further action,
as the victim is then deemed to be the sinner. 82 Indeed, Maimonides emphasizes the responsibility incumbent on the victim, writing
that it is improper for a person to withhold forgiveness; instead, a
victim should be receptive to the wrongdoer's genuine attempts at
reconciliation and atonement.83
CONCLUSION

Despite the prominent position it has held for millennia in religious and moral thinking, the atonement model is relatively new to
pation of an injured party. Absent the eventual complicity of the injured party, the
apologizer's words are just talk.").
79. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1828. Cf Cohen supra note 28, at 1021 (citing psychological evidence finding that "an injured party ... who fails to forgive after receiving
an apology [ ] may suffer the corrosive effects of storing anger"); Levi, supra note 26,
at 1178 ("By apologizing, the offender acknowledges her diminutive moral stature
and asks for restorative forgiveness. She also acknowledges the existence and importance (to both parties) of the moral register itself. When the apologizee gestures to
acknowledge that meaning, he closes the circle of performance, thus establishing a
new moral equilibrium."); Nygaard, supra note 3, at 1012.
For the offender who is sincerely repentant; feels shame for his act; who has
recaptured compassion for the feelings of others; realizes the pain he has
caused; and, who truly desires to turn a new leaf and be reconciled with
society; the system must determine how it can facilitate that desire, not frustrate it out of ignorance or misguided notions.
Id.
80. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:9; RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14, ch. 1, at 44.
81. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:9; RABBENU YONAH GERONDI, supra note 14, ch. 4, at 19.
82. See MAIMONIDES, supra note 10, Laws of Teshuva 2:9.
83. See id. at 2:10.
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American legal theory. Professor Garvey's attempt to offer a systematic depiction and analysis of the process of atonement and its
possible relevance to American law appears to represent the most
extensive such effort to date.
As Garvey himself concedes, any application of a theory of
atonement to the American legal system will encounter a number
of problems and objections. For example, he acknowledges that
"[i]f in the end you remain convinced that the ideal of community
on which I base my account of atonement is indeed dangerous or
irretrievable, then you will ... be forced to turn elsewhere for your

understanding of punishment."' These difficulties only increase
when the analysis relates the concept of teshuva from Jewish law
and philosophy to American law.85 Nevertheless, Garvey's attempt
is successful, for reasons that would appear to apply to theories of
teshuva as well.
First, Garvey emphasizes that his "immediate aim is normative,
not practical," and, therefore, "the discussion proceeds at a high
level of abstraction" rather than "develop[ing] any concrete proposals for institutional or doctrinal reform."86 Second, Garvey explains that a new model is necessary based on his conclusion that
"the prevailing models of punishment ... deterrence[,] retributivism[,] restorativism and libertarianism ... fall short. '87 Finally, as

Professor David Dolinko noted in introducing the symposium in
which Garvey participated, Garvey's proposal offers a fresh perspective at a time when "[c]riminal punishment is an institution
that is large, growing, and quite possibly mutating into new and
surprising forms."88 Ultimately, it is perhaps ironic that, in providing a new theory of punishment for American legal thought to consider in a future millennium, Garvey has in fact looked back to
theories of atonement and teshuva that have spanned millennia of
the past. The path to teshuva may indeed provide insight in formulating a new perspective on the notions of punishment underlying
American law.
84. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1803.
85. Indeed, in the past I have expressed my own doubts about attempts to derive
practical lessons for the application of the death penalty in the United States based on
the approach to capital punishment in Jewish law, because, "[a]lthough the processes
of repentance and atonement are inherent parts of the Jewish legal system, that is
clearly not the case in American penal law." See Levine, Capital Punishment, supra
note 16, at 1043 & nn.22-24. See also discussion supra note 16.
86. Garvey, supra note 2, at 1804.
87. Id. at 1829-30.
88. David Dolinko, The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1719, 1726
(1999).

AS
A&
ET

